I was looking recently at a debate on YouTube between Mike Licona and
Greg Cavin on the resurrection of Jesus.
One of the arguments that Cavin used against the resurrection caught my
attention and I have been thinking about it since. I think I am right in saying that it is an
argument that was also used by the 18th century humanist, David Hume.
The argument from
probability against Jesus’ resurrection
The argument I have in mind is the one that Cavin used concerning
probability. He argued that since we
have constant experience that people who die remain dead, the probability that
Jesus rose from the dead has to be extremely small.
I think Licona did a pretty good job of answering this argument. Nevertheless, I would like to give my own
answer to it here. Like Licona, I am
convinced that the argument is invalid, and I want to explain exactly why this
is so.
Claims of something
extraordinary
To begin with, let’s think of two particular situations where a
claim is made that something extraordinary has happened, and where someone uses
an argument from probability to deny the claim.
First, suppose that a man claims he can hold his breath underwater
for 30 minutes. Suppose too that someone
then makes an argument from probability that there is no record of anyone ever
being able to do this, and that the claim is therefore extremely unlikely to be
true. (I have checked online and the
world record is apparently 22 minutes.) This
person then demands evidence from the man who made the claim. The man, however, refuses to demonstrate that
he can hold his breath for 30 minutes. Nor
does he provide any other evidence to support his claim.
In this case, in the absence of any evidence to support the claim,
the argument from probability is extremely strong. We are sure that billions of people cannot hold
their breath for 30 minutes, and we know of no one who can. It is therefore extremely improbable that the
man who claimed to be able to do this can in fact do so.
However, suppose that another man also claims to be able to hold
his breath underwater for 30 minutes. And
suppose too that the argument from probability is used to argue that this claim
is extremely unlikely to be true, and that again a challenge is issued to the
man who made the claim.
This time, however, astonishingly, the man proceeds to do exactly
what he claimed he could do. In front of
an amazed audience he submerges himself in water for a full 30 minutes with no
ill effects.
The key thing to note here is that the evidence that this man can
in fact hold his breath underwater for 30 minutes negates the argument from
probability which might seem to support the view that doing this is virtually
impossible if not completely impossible.
The argument from probability becomes redundant in the face of
compelling evidence.
The two examples I have given both involve a claim to
extraordinary action, but they are at opposite extremes in terms of the
evidence that is offered to support the claim.
In the former case, there is no evidence at all supporting the claim. In the latter case, there is compelling
evidence that the claim is true. In the
former case, the argument from probability against the claim stands unscathed. In the latter case, the argument from
probability is completely negated.
The argument from
probability does not have a fixed value
Whenever a claim is made that someone has done or experienced
something extraordinary, the evidence supporting the claim will either not
exist (as in my first example), or it will be compelling (as in my second
example), or it will lie somewhere between these two extremes.
Crucially, the stronger the evidence supporting a claim to
something extraordinary, the weaker the argument from probability against the
claim becomes. The argument from
probability is not a piece of evidence that has a fixed value. Even if we grant that the argument from
probability should be regarded as a piece of evidence in its own right, its
value nevertheless depends on the strength of other evidence that supports a
claim to something extraordinary. The
stronger that evidence, the more the argument from probability is negated.
Cavin’s mistake
In his use of the argument from probability against Jesus’
resurrection, Cavin seems to see this argument as having a fixed value as a
piece of evidence. However, this is a big
mistake. Rather, the argument from
probability is unlike pieces of evidence for or against the resurrection that
have a fixed value.
I have already noted that in the case of a man who is seen to hold
his breath underwater for 30 minutes, supporting evidence would completely
negate the validity of the argument from probability. Similarly, if there were compelling tangible evidence
for Jesus’ resurrection, this would not stand in tension with Cavin’s argument
from probability. It would completely
negate the weight of this argument. Or,
if the evidence for the resurrection were a bit less than compelling, say only very
strong, it would correspondingly make Cavin’s argument from probability very weak.
A flawed argument
There may be some non-Christians, who know about the probability
argument that Cavin uses, and who argue along these lines:
There is some good evidence supporting the resurrection of Jesus. However, given that we have so much
experience of people who die remaining dead, the improbability of Jesus rising
from the dead outweighs the evidence supporting his resurrection. Therefore, on balance we should reject belief
in Jesus’ resurrection.
However, this line of reasoning wrongly assumes that the argument
from probability has a fixed value regardless of the strength of evidence
supporting the resurrection. In fact, if
there is good evidence supporting the resurrection, the argument from
probability will be weakened, or even overpowered, by this evidence.
Evidence for Jesus’
resurrection
I would submit that the evidence is in fact very strong that Jesus
did rise from the dead. Although I don’t
intend to argue the case here, I will outline what is in my view the most
important argument that supports the resurrection:
In 1 Corinthians 15, the apostle Paul makes a list of occasions on
which he says that the risen Jesus appeared to various people. It is highly plausible that at least most of
the items on this list involved genuine claims to have seen Jesus after his
death. It is highly implausible that many
of the people who genuinely made claims were lying. It is just as implausible that many of them
were mistaken. Hence we have a very
strong piece of evidence for the resurrection.
For much more on this, see my article: ‘A Very Strong Piece of Evidence
for the Resurrection of Jesus’ (see link below).
The evidence in 1 Corinthians 15, along with much more evidence
besides, severely weakens Cavin’s argument from probability that is used
against the resurrection. Extraordinary
though it is, the evidence strongly suggests that Jesus really did rise from
the dead.
See also:
